University of Arizona

Post-Doc, Ecology and Evolutionary Biology

PERT Research Fellow

Center for Insect Science

About

In social animals, exploitative strategies often create a paradox in which the most detrimental strategy for the group is also the most fit strategy within the group. This is also referred to as the tragedy of the commons (TOC), an outcome resulting from the unlimited access of individuals to a finite resource. In the typical evolutionary formulation, altruists benefit the group, selfishness undermines altruism, leaving many questions concerning how does altruism evolve in the ever-presence of selfishness.

My current research focuses on how the TOC also applies to the over-exploitation of females as a mating resource. Males frequently diminish the long-term reproductive success of females in an effort to mate with them over the short-term. I investigate this conflict in the water strider (Aquarius remigis) using a multilevel selection approach.

I also maintain research interests in detangling the altruism paradox. An often overlooked aspect of game theory is that not only do the altruists suffer in the presence of selfishness, but other selfish individuals also suffer as selfishness increases in frequency. I propose that selfish individuals have an evolutionary incentive to punish other selfish individuals (called selfish punishers), thereby increasing the proportion of cooperators for them to exploit and transforming selfishness in to a self-limiting strategy. I continue explore ‘selfish punishment’ in both theoretical models as well as empirical studies on human and non-human animals.

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